E.C.O. v. Compton, SJC – 11259

Recent case on 209A restraining orders--E.C.O. v. Compton, SJC – 11259 The issue in this case was whether a parent may seek an extension of an abuse prevention order under G.L. c. 209A to prevent his daughter, who was sixteen years of age, from voluntarily engaging in a sexual relationship with an adult. The adult defendant in this case was twenty-four years of age, and a citizen of the United Kingdom. He met the daughter while she was traveling in Europe. After the daughter returned home to Massachusetts, they maintained a relationship via electronic communication. The defendant was aware of the daughter’s age. The electronic communication between them suggested a mutual attraction, including sexual remarks and some comments about furnishing the daughter with alcohol. The defendant planned a trip to the daughter’s hometown, and reserved space in a nearby inn while the daughter’s parents were out of town. The father filed a complaint for protection under G.L. c. 209A, but admitted during cross-examination that the defendant had not threatened physical harm to the daughter, or had involuntary sexual relations with her. The SJC held that there was no “abuse” under G.L. c. 209A, §1(b) and as such there was no basis for issuing the extension order. The father tried to argue that there was “abuse” because by suggesting that he was going to supply the daughter with alcohol, the defendant placed the daughter in fear of imminent serious physical harm. The court disagreed, comparing the definition of “abuse” under the statute with the common-law definition of the crime of assault. In order to be considered “abuse”, the defendant’s behavior must have placed the daughter in reasonable apprehension that the defendant might physically abuse her. The defendant’s act of making passing references to alcohol in his electronic communications with the daughter did not rise to the level of “abuse” as defined under the statute. However, the court did find evidence of a “substantive dating relationship”, noting the “real time” nature of many of the couple’s electronic communications. The court noted the changing technological nature of relationships, and the importance of Chapter 209A including substantial “electronic” relationships within the definition of “substantive dating relationship”. Nevertheless, because abuse was not established, the abuse prevention order issue by the lower court was vacated.

Morales v. Morales, SJC 11104

A recent family law decision on material change of circumstances--Morales v. Morales, SJC 11104 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a divorced parent no longer needs to prove a substantial change in circumstances to modify a child support order. The SJC instead focused on the language of Massachusetts General Law chapter 208, §28, which provides that modification may be made “if there is an inconsistency between the amount of the existing order and the amount that would result from application of the child support guidelines”. This standard is known as the inconsistency standard and will be the standard that Massachusetts judges should apply to all child support modification cases going forward. In Morales, the previous child support order required Father to make weekly child support payments to Mother for the care of their child. Approximately one year after the order for support entered, Mother requested modification based on Father’s recent job promotion. The Probate and Family Court found that this did not constitute a “material and substantial change in circumstances” and dismissed the complaint. The Appeals Court affirmed in an unpublished decision. The SJC remanded the case for consideration based on the inconsistency standard rather than the material and substantial change in circumstances standard.